Autores:

Carlos Carrillo-Tudela, Leo Kaas, Benjamin Lochner

Resumen

Firms and workers predominately match via job postings, networks of personal contacts or the public employment agency, all of which help to ameliorate labor market frictions. We investigate how firms’ differential use of these search channels impacts workers’ turnover, wage inequality and labor market sorting. Using novel linked survey administrative data we document each channel’s separate role for matching high-wage firms and high-wage workers and for job mobility. To evaluate the relevance of these search channels for employment, wages and sorting, we structurally estimate an equilibrium job ladder model featuring two-sided heterogeneity and endogenous recruitment effort in multiple search technologies. The estimation reveals that job postings are
the most instrumental channel for positive worker-firm sorting. Although the public employment agency provides lower hiring rates for firms, its removal has sizeable consequences, with aggregate employment declining by 1.4 percent and rising bottom wage inequality, but little effect on sorting.

Expositor

Carlos Carrillo-Tudela

Macroeconomista laboral, profesor en economía de la Universidad de Essex, Reino Unido y jefe del departamento de economía de la misma universidad. Es co-editor de la revista académica “Labour Economics” de la Asociación de Economistas Laborales de Europa (EALE). El Prof. Carrillo Tudela es egresado de la UP (1995) y se desempeñó como docente durante 1996-2000 en el programa de entrenamiento docente. Recibió su maestría y doctorado en economía de la Universidad de Essex, Reino Unido en el 2006.

Por su tesis doctoral ganó el premio “Young Economist Award” de la Asociación de Economistas Europeos en el 2005.