Autores: Claudia M. Landeo, Maxim Nikitin, Sergei Izmalkov

Resumen

We study the optimal civil justice design in a two-sided private information environment. Using a mechanism design approach, we identify the properties that must be satisfied by an optimal civil justice system to ensure access to justice and maximal compensation to the victims at the minimum expected cost of producing evidence. We show that full revelation of private information requires the production of evidence in just a subset of legal cases. The American rule arises endogenously as the socially optimal cost-allocation rule only under certain conditions. A tort reform that implements the optimal mechanism in real-world settings is feasible.

Expositora

Claudia Landeo

Dr. Claudia Landeo is a Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics of the University of Alberta. She received her B.A. in Economics from the Universidad del Pac´ıfico, and her M.P.A. in Public Policy, M.A. in Economics and Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Pittsburgh, where she was the recipient of the Andrew W. Mellon Award and the Reuben E. Slesinger Research Award. Professor Landeo has served as Senior Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School and Senior Research Scholar in Law at Harvard Law School. Dr. Landeo has also served as Visiting Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of Law, Research Scholar in Economics at Northwestern University Kellogg School of Management, and Visiting Professor of Economics and Research Scholar in Economics at Carnegie Mellon University John H. Heinz School. Professor Landeo’s work has been published in top generalinterest economics journals such as the American Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, and the RAND Journal of Economics, top law and economics journals such as the Journal of Law and Economics and the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, and top law journals such as the Yale Journal on Regulation and the University of Chicago Law Review. Her research has been funded by major granting agencies such as the Russell Sage Foundation and the National Science Foundation. Dr. Landeo has discussed her work at leading academic venues in North and South America, Europe and Australia such as the NBER Summer Meetings in Law and Economics. 

Professor Landeo’s research is focused on the Economic Analysis of Law and Industrial Organization. She applies game-theoretic modeling, mechanism-design tools, experimental economics methods, and legal analysis to the assessment and design of market and legal institutions. Dr. Landeo has studied the efficiency properties of bargaining institutions in legal settings including partnership dissolution provisions and pretrial bargaining mechanisms, and the design of law enforcement policies with ordered leniency. In addition, her work has provided insights regarding the use of vertical restraints by incumbent monopolists to exclude potential entrants, and the design of incentive contracts for teams. Professor Landeo is currently working on the design of optimal civil justice systems and optimal litigation finance institutions.